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John Henry Schlegel
and The Muppet Show
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY†
I intend to take seriously Schlegel’s admonition, which
was a kind of proxy for a call for papers, that we are to engage
in “serious fun,” because if anyone knows how to have fun
being serious, it’s Schlegel. And Schlegel’s fun is not
frivolous, though it contains an element of whimsy, and I
would and will argue that in some sense it is the key to
understanding his work in the classroom and in his
scholarship because it captures a certain critical stance that
animates that work. (That is not to say that Schlegel does
not know how to laugh, which he often does, even at himself.
Indeed, you could often hear Schlegel’s voice and laugh
reverberating off the walls in the stairwells and hallways of
the law school, well before he appeared at your office door.)
In order to set the scene, I want to recur to a certain
pattern established early in my relationship with him as a

†University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University at Buffalo
School of Law, State University of New York. I would like to thank Robert Berger,
Barry Cushman, David Engel, George Kannar, Bruce Mann, Lynn Mather,
Matthew Steilen, Robert Steinfeld, Barry Sullivan, Winnifred Sullivan, David
Westbrook, and G. Edward White for reading and commenting on this symposium
contribution. In particular, Dianne Avery patiently provided an extremely
thoughtful, perceptive, and careful reading, proving once again that it may take
more than one person to understand Schlegel, who characteristically did not wish
to read this paper, saying “I’ll deal with it later.” Nevertheless, I need to thank
him anyway, for more than forty years of reading, conversation, and friendship.
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colleague and friend. For almost forty years, Schlegel and I
talked on the phone once or twice nearly every day (not
texted or emailed). A typical phone call might begin with
Schlegel calling and starting the conversation midthought,
beginning with a stream of consciousness, often excited,
occasionally annoyed, always engaged, that expressed his
desire to communicate something he had just discovered,
observed, or read, or discussed with someone else, a
byproduct of the restless range of his intellectual curiosity. I
usually let him talk for about 45 seconds or a minute before
gently interrupting him and saying something like,
“Schlegel, what the hell are you talking about?” (Though it is
possible that I didn’t always say “hell.”) He, of course, simply
assumed I knew what was on his mind and where it came
from. He would then explain what prompted the phone call,
and then it would become apparent why he wanted to share
the experience, insight, or information. But just as I became
fully locked into the conversation, he was gone. I mean gone
in a flash, just abruptly hanging up, usually not even saying
good-bye, often again in midsentence just as he had entered.
Having accomplished his goal, his business with me was
done and he simply moved on, as in disappeared. The first
time this happened I said to myself, “Well, that was rude,” or
weird. But I just got used to it, and when I checked around,
I realized the pattern occurred with nearly everybody. All he
wanted to do was to share something with you that he
thought might interest you or that he had learned. He was
engaging in an act of intellectual community and kinship. At
his core, Schlegel is an old-fashioned gentleman. He wasn’t
being rude; it was just Schlegel being Schlegel.
This brings me to the story of how these phone calls
began, which in retrospect I realize has everything to do with
Schlegel’s work. We started talking on the phone regularly
in the late 1970s when we both realized that one evening a
week we both sat down with our kids in our respective homes
to watch The Muppet Show. For the children, the Muppets
were this wonderful mashup of antic and manic characters

2021]

SCHLEGEL AND THE MUPPET SHOW

103

dressed in odd garb, doing wild things, gesturing in overly
expressive ways, making fun of each other, finding
themselves in improbable situations with improbable guests,
or having fun in constant and loud motion. It all had a certain
innocent and harmless charm about it for kids. But let’s face
it. The show was really for adults, though its ability easily to
bridge the generations was part of the attraction. The jokes
and funny lines, however, were for grownups, incorporating
some really serious political and cultural satire, with a tone
of irreverence, and trenchant, if not subversive, commentary
on and observations about the world we occupied.
Precisely one minute after the show ended each week,
the phone would ring and what became our ritual would
start. It was Schlegel asking, “What did you think?” And so
the serious process of deconstruction would begin as we
walked through the show again. What did we like or not like?
What worked or did not work? And invariably we focused on
two characters. Not Oscar the Grouch (as one might expect
from Schlegel) or the Count (who found his way into a title of
a Schlegel article1). They were Sesame Street characters
anyway. But Statler and Waldorf, the two elderly
curmudgeons seated in a theater box overlooking the stage,
who spewed totally dismissive comments about what they
were watching. They were nothing but critical of what they
saw, throwing off one-liners eviscerating what they were
witnessing on the show though they never left and kept
watching, endlessly entertained and contemptuous. They
would occasionally ask each other why they continued to
observe the show, and they could be critical of themselves for
not fleeing. We both found a natural affinity for them.

1. John Henry Schlegel, Drawing Back from the Abyss, or Lessons Learned
from Count von Count, 1 THE CRIT 16 (2008). I suppose here is as good a place as
any to say it, but Schlegel consistently leads the league with the most arresting
article titles in the business. (I’m not sure he really works on them; they just seem
to trip naturally off his tongue.) And as a bonus every once in a while, they tip
you off as to what the article is actually about.
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Now here is the interesting twist to Statler and Waldorf.
Jim Henson, the creator of the Muppets, in fact played the
character of Waldorf. Henson was one of the extraordinary
cultural geniuses of late twentieth-century America, but
consider for a moment his stance as he inhabited the
heckling character of Waldorf. Henson was actually
participating in an active critique of what he had just created
and to which he was fully committed and in which he was
entrenched. And Henson as Waldorf is sort of emblematic of
Schlegel’s role as a legal educator and a legal historian,
offering up his critical intelligence in a system of thought in
which he is embedded after having invested some creative
capital in the enterprise. Schlegel, a contrarian by nature
like Waldorf, has a kind of roving commission as a critic at
large, almost a literary critic. But like Waldorf, what he
really wants to know is what in the show works or how it
works, what doesn’t work, or how do things function. In that
sense, in addition to being a critic of sorts, Schlegel is also a
kind of mechanical engineer with his eye on the design of
various moving parts in law and history, and who then
attempts to determine whether those parts operate as
designed, though there is nothing at all mechanical about
Schlegel.
At this point, it’s a fair question to ask so how does this
relate to Schlegel’s actual work and method? I want to divide
the discussion into two parts, one focused on his teaching and
one on his scholarship, though most of what I will have to say
about his written work will center on something that most
people have probably not read, his long and remarkable book
manuscript on the economic history of the city of Buffalo and
the role of law therein.
I.
Beginning in the early 1980s, Schlegel began requiring
his corporations students to obtain a student subscription to
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the Wall Street Journal.2 Among other historical moments
and actors, these were the heady junk bond days of Michael
Milken and the corporate raiding and greenmail time of
Boone Pickens. And Schlegel would begin each and every
class with the same simple question: “What’s in today’s
paper?” Before his students encountered law (if they were
ever to encounter law), they had to answer the question:
what happened today or yesterday in the real world? Kind of
a risky strategy in a law school when you think about it.
Why did he start class that way? First, the move was an
expression of and adaptation to Schlegel’s deep antipathy to
many of the corporations casebooks of the time, with their
emphasis on legal doctrine, and his own thorough skepticism
about the efficacy of legal rules. Schlegel did not think the
place to start was law. Second, he thought instead that
students needed to know what corporate behavior looked
like, including an examination of what corporations were
trying to accomplish, how they went about achieving their
purposes or goals, how they structured transactions, what
the pieces of paper they drafted and issued looked like, and
how they responded to the needs and demands of their
clients. In a way, Schlegel was trying to inculcate Karl
Llewellyn’s “situation sense”3 in law students at an early
stage (and not just in judges), “to root discussion and
observations in the soil of practice, of common knowledge,”4
and “to indicate the type-facts in their context.”5 Llewellyn
had warned that “delving into books rather than into life to
find situation-reason or rule-reason must, of course, when
the books are narrow, constrict the trove.”6 So in a sense,
Schlegel’s pedagogical strategy was an extension of some
2. The following account is based on conversations with Schlegel and, in
some ways, my interpretation of his rendering of his practice.
3. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
121–57 (1960).
4. Id. at 59.
5. Id. at 60.
6. Id. at 166.
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corners of the legal realist agenda, and it had two organizing
principles capturing two interrelated and potentially
contradictory reasons.
Drawing also on early law and society literature,
Schlegel first wanted students to see law in action. If you
want to see law in action, read the Journal. But second, and
the real purpose, was that he wanted students to understand
that, from his perspective, corporate behavior had little or
nothing to do with law, or in other words how little corporate
law mattered. Rules did not reflect what was really going on.
Markets might help to answer that question. It was almost
as if corporations and their officers decided what they
wanted to do, and then they looked around for the law that
would allow them to do it or justify their behavior, or they
shaped the law to help them accomplish their goals. In other
words, there might be a conflict between wanting students to
see the law in action, but at the same time presenting them
with evidence that law was not much in action.
Schlegel occasionally coupled the daily Wall Street
Journal reading exercise with a set of his own selected cases
culled from the Delaware Supreme Court. The dozen or so
cases in a sense supplemented the daily foray into the news.
They tended to focus on director and officer obligations and
liabilities and corporate transactions, and in Schlegel’s view
they captured the attitudes of an important court in the
world of corporate law that was not hostile to but suspicious
of corporate behavior. In the aggregate, the question was
what did the cases say about what we would now call
corporate responsibility. The organizing premise was
disarmingly simple. We are going to explore how things work
in reality in order to better prepare you to practice law. In
the process you might learn a little law to help you navigate
the system of corporate behavior.
II.
I would argue that similar themes and concerns animate
Schlegel’s enormously diverse scholarship. From legal
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realism7 to critical legal studies (his Stanford article on an
“intimate, opinionated, and affectionate history” of CLS8
seems to me to be a very good example of Statler and Waldorf
in action, bringing the critical gaze and observations from
both off stage and simultaneously embedded, except that it
was far too “affectionate” for Waldorf’s taste), to legal
education (including the institutions themselves,9 what
passes for past and current theories of legal education,10 the
professional identity of legal academics,11 and the
relationship or dance between them all), to his constant
exploration and criticism of the parameters and foundational
principles of intellectual history and the art and challenge of
doing history,12 to legal theory and legal scholarship,13 to his

7. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) [hereinafter SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM].
8. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV.
391 (1984).
9. Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982).
10. See John Henry Schlegel, Those Weren’t “The Good Old Days,” Just the
Old Days: Laura Kalman on Yale Law School in the Sixties, 32 LAW & SOC. INQ.
841 (2007) (review of LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT
AND REVERBERATIONS (2005)); see also John Henry Schlegel & David M. Trubek,
Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD
CLARK 81 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991); John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy
Or, The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984) (reviewing
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S (1983) and CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN LAW,
LAW AND LEARNING: REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF CANADA (1983)).
11. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the Legal
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 311 (1985).
12. John Henry Schlegel, Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers? Does
Richard Posner Ever Sleep? Writing About Jurisprudence, High Culture and the
History of Intellectuals, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 277 (1997) (review of NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
13. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Theory and American Legal
Education: A Snake Swallowing Its Tail?, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN
AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 49 (Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1989).
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objections to the constraining power of the tyranny of the
lines drawn between academic disciplines (both within and
outside of law) as an inhibiting force in obtaining real
knowledge that mattered,14 to economic change and its
history and its connection to law.15 Schlegel is pretty
insistent and consistent in trying to parse out how things
work, function, and operate. He is also somewhat unsparing
in his evaluation and critique of the success of those
institutions and ideas and people associated with them, glad
to point to what their failures may be, and he tells us so in
his introductory notes to this conference.16
I want to focus, however, on just one of Schlegel’s
scholarly contributions, one that is a major accomplishment
though as yet unpublished, and which I think illustrates his
method of doing history and the incorporation of his attitudes
about the craft. The book, entitled “While Waiting for Rain:
Community, Economy and Law in a Time of Change,”17 is a
long meditation on the forces of economic change in late
nineteenth- and twentieth-century America that ultimately
focuses on the impact of those forces on the City of Buffalo
and leads to a searching interrogation in painstaking detail
of the reasons for the city’s decline over time. The book
contains speculation about the nature of economic
development, the role of law in the process of economic
change, Buffalo’s place in the path of that development and
14. See John Henry Schlegel, From High in the Paper Tower, An Essay on von
Humboldt’s University, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 865 (2004).
15. See John Henry Schlegel, Law and Economic Change During the Short
Twentieth Century, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 563 (Michael
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schlegel, Law and
Economic Change].
16. I have to say that I was pretty struck by his own summary of the
organizing premises of his work. I had already started to work on this Essay
before I first read his “Notes,” and I had already told him about what I was
thinking of writing. He said to me: “Yes, that’s it.” I don’t know if I felt better or
worse.
17. John Henry Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain: Community, Economy and
Law in a Time of Change 1 (2017) [hereinafter Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain]
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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change, and what the future might hold. In places it is deeply
informed by the work and urban theory of Jane Jacobs,
particularly The Death and Life of Great American Cities
(1961), The Economy of Cities (1969), and Cities and the
Wealth of Nations (1984). Jacobs wanted to know how cities
work and how cities fail. So does Schlegel; it is easy to see
why he would have been attracted to her writing on the
subject and why Buffalo became his case study.
Schlegel’s book is divided into five parts, the first three
of which I want to discuss. Part I is a broad, sweeping
description of law and economic change in America,
beginning with a brief sketch of economic life before the Civil
War, but primarily devoting attention to the late nineteenth
century and particularly the twentieth century. He had
rehearsed some of his themes in his discussion of the
twentieth century in his essay on law and economic change
in The Cambridge History of Law in America.18 Part II
switches to a parallel account of “community and economic
change in America: Buffalo,”19 more or less lining up Buffalo
with the corresponding decades and events in the greater
American economy. And Part III on “thinking about
economic development”20 seeks to apply the insights of
Jacobs’s work to the Buffalo experience. So the thick
description of the history of the Buffalo economic story is in
effect placed between the bookends of two types of context,
the greater American experience and the theoretical work of
Jacobs on what animates the success and failure of economic
life and community in urban environments. 21

18. Schlegel, Law and Economic Change, supra note 15.
19. Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain, supra note 17, at 101.
20. Id. at 189.
21. Parts IV and V of the book manuscript offer Schlegel’s speculations about
what the future holds both for Buffalo and the United States, based on his
understanding of what has passed before in the economic experiences of each.
Though interesting, they are somewhat tangential to my concerns here. See
generally id. at 225–323.
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In each of these three parts, Schlegel maintains a certain
integrity of methodological inquiry. In Part I, by exploring
law’s relationship to economic change, he emphasizes how
law works or does not work. He repeatedly asks about the
process of economic change, “What’s law got to do with it?”
In Part II, he describes what drove economic change in
Buffalo, what dynamic elements were introduced that led to
growth and decline, and how did they function individually
and in interaction with each other; in other words how did
they arise and how did they work. In Part III, he uses the
models developed by Jacobs to forge a theory of sorts about
how economic change and community function, in order to
explain or make some sense of the Buffalo experience. Each
of the three parts explores law, economic change, and
community, and the themes in each part occasionally
overlap.
II. A.
Schlegel begins his interrogation of law and economic
change in Part I with two questions of definition, economy
and law. Economy means “a persistent market structure that
is the fusion of an understanding of economic life with the
patterns of behavior within the economic, political, and social
institutions that enact that understanding.”22 In Schlegel’s
rendering, the economy is a kind of capitalist machine that
would go of itself, or to mix metaphors, a sort of system of
feedback loops. Law is defined as “the many and variable
actions undertaken by lawyers and other governmental
officials, the formal and effective norms originating from the
practices of these individuals, and the systematic
presuppositions shared among them.”23 Norms, practices,
and presuppositions all seem related to the legal realist
agenda that occupied Schlegel in the earlier portion of his

22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 19–20.
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scholarly career,24 and speak in some ways to the work of
Willard Hurst.25 As Schlegel traverses the terrain of two
hundred years of American economic life leading to the
twenty-first century, he finds the steady unfolding of
economic innovation coupled with Schumpeter’s creative
destruction,26 from the “archipelago of agricultural/trading
economies,”27 to the rise of competition, the efforts to tame
competition, the associationalist ideal and how it worked, the
unraveling of the late twentieth-century economy and
norms, and the attempts to restore them. Along the way, one
encounters financial panics, depressions, wars, patterns of
economic growth and decline, and learns about a dizzying
array of economic activities, organizations, and actors.
From time to time, Schlegel pauses after describing
economic behavior in particular decades or an era and asks
in a very skeptical voice, “What’s law got to do with it?”28
Depending on the situation (and the distinctive moments of
economic development and change, the devil is in the
details), the answer is, “[e]verything and often nothing.”29
“Everything” includes
the great, mostly silent work of law constantly refining
understandings of mine and thine, of property and contract, and
also of the institutional structures within which all of life is lived.
These refinements are most often marginal changes in law, though
sometime over a long period of time what was first marginal may
cumulatively turn out to be something close to transformative[,]30

24. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 7.
25. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950).
26. John Henry Schlegel, On the Many Flavors of Capitalism or Reflections
on Schumpeter’s Ghost, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 965 (2009).
27. Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain, supra note 17, at 21–26.
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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like married women’s property rights or the law of master
and servant. Most of the refinements are “matters of state
law,”31 often positive law. In the economic realm before the
Civil War, Schlegel sees the “silent work” of law “going on.”32
There are exceptions, “[b]ut most of it [law] passes silently,
noticed only in retrospect as patterns become clear, the law
as a vast janitorial organization cleaning up after life.”33
And, of course, in Schlegel’s retelling, pre-Civil War, “[o]ne
might easily claim that law did nothing during these years”34
or at least was “very close” to fitting into “being a part of the
great silent background of law.”35 (Examples include the
tariff, the federal budget, the postal service, post roads, ports
and navigable waterways and their maintenance in the
federal domain, and, on the state and local level, building
canals and investing in early railroads.)
Schlegel recurs to the question after his description of
the 1870s and 1880s:
Again, the question “What’s law got to do with it?” comes to mind.
Even after noting the work in establishing a national paper
currency, that of facilitating the expansion of railroads and
populating the lands west of the Mississippi, and that of beginning
railroad regulation, this question persists. The answer, of course,
depends on what “it” is.36

But that “is not to say that there was no law around.
When there is trouble[,] . . . at least American people go to
law.”37 As to problems of competition, and pools, cartels,
trusts, and monopolies during this period, however,
[g]oing to law was not by any means a wholly successful strategy
for any actor in these or any other years. Law sometimes helps, but

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Id. at 33.
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often does not . . . . And when law helps it sometimes supplies just
what was asked for, but often supplies something quite different.
And whether it delivers what was asked for or something different,
what it delivers may have the intended results, but often does not.
Indeed, perversely, sometimes law’s help makes things worse.38

So “[n]either the Interstate Commerce Act nor the Sherman
Antitrust Act turned out to work exactly as their supporters
wanted or their opponents feared. Law is, after all is said and
done, an ambiguous tool in the hands of citizens.”39
The hallmarks of Schlegel’s work are prevalent: a core
examination of how things actually work (law and/or
economy) or, if they work as designed, skepticism about legal
rules and their efficacy. He places law more or less firmly at
the margins (at least of economic life), where private law
rules reside primarily in the background, more or less
silently controlling the ebb and flow of economic activity.
Legislators create law to supplement the basic underlying
legal rules of social and economic organization in order to
either facilitate or restrain change.
For the 1890s through the entry of the United States in
World War I, Schlegel tells us “[t]hat law has something to
do with this part of my story of an extraordinary period of
industrial expansion followed by one of industrial
concentration is relatively obvious. What is not obvious is the
answer.”40 The 1920s and 1930s brought further
transformations and deep shocks to economic systems, which
challenged assumed faiths and coincided with the emergence
of new industries and technology (the widening spread of
electrical power, automobiles, air travel, radios, etc.).
For the 1920s and 1930s, Schlegel spells out the core
ideas governing much of economic thought, the
associationalist ideal. He defines the ideal as

38. Id. at 33–34.
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id. at 39.
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essentially a Main Street, though not therefore a small town,
theory. It hoped to maintain high wages through the high prices
that would support the small, local retail or wholesale businesses
that were being undercut by the growth of so-called “discounters,”
large regional or national retailers, as well as the more competitive
sectors of the producer economy. . . . [Its] design . . . was for an
economy of uniform, high prices, such as that found in more
oligopolistic markets . . . .41

It was, however, “[n]ot laissez-faire in a different guise” for
it “assumed some level of governmental involvement in the
economy.”42
As to law, “[t]he Twenties and Thirties further
sharpen[ed] questions about the relationship between law
and economic change.”43 The New Deal legislation, in
response to economic turmoil “in agriculture, banking,
communications, labor, securities, and transportation . . .
also exemplif[ed] the way that law is regularly mobilized in
times of trouble. All were significant changes in the doctrinal
matrix that is the law at a time and place.”44 But at the end
of the day, Schlegel tells us “the role that these statutes
played in economic change remains unclear.”45 And “[l]aw
changes lots of things in the details of economic life for the
participants without bringing about a transformation of the
economy from one enacted understanding of economic life to
another.”46
So too was associationalism at work in the 1940s and
1950s. “The continued authority of the Associationalist ideal
of managed, rather than ruinous, competition seemingly
protected retail business owners, though here the
development of new national chains . . . ought to have given

41. Id. at 46.
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id. at 49.
44. Id. at 49–50.
45. Id. at 50.
46. Id. at 51.
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careful observers pause.”47 What emerged “in retrospect was
a hot-house economy, insulated from competition abroad and
limited in competitive pressures at home,” and it produced “a
dramatic increase in the size of the middle class, both white
collar and blue.”48 It was “built on three things: reasonably
high wages[,] low housing costs, . . . and the extension of
college education.”49
As the economy hummed along in the 1940s and 1950s,
law was “quite silent as well.”50 The only major pieces of
economic legislation were the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and
the Interstate Highway Act of 1957. But according to
Schlegel, “[t]he relative silence of law is, of course,
misleading. Narrowly conceived as the formal and effective
norms originating from governmental entities, especially the
law of property, contract and theft, . . . law is always there,
the modest hum of a faithful dynamo.”51
One might say that Schlegel is ambivalent about law,
however he defines it (including actions undertaken by
government officials, which presumably includes making law
through legislation). I do not think he is agnostic about law;
he has a stance (law is at best marginal). Though I think it
is closer to the truth to describe him as profoundly skeptical
about law and its influence on matters of economic change,
sort of legal realism amplified by critical legal studies. Law’s
impact may be differentially measured in long-term
economic changes (incremental at best, though occasionally
transformative) as opposed to short-term economic changes
(perhaps more influential when specifically targeted and
focused). And when law is invoked as an example of the
formal intention to make changes economically, it almost
always is in the realm of legislation or positive law. (It is also
47. Id. at 55.
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 61.
51. Id.
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quite possible, of course, to argue that some examples of
social legislation mattered, including economically even in
the face of resistance, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964.)
The specter of Schlegel as a positivist is more than a little
unnerving, until one understands that he does not think
that, in other than a few instances, legislation or “law”
mattered much anyway or at all. He might concede that
sometimes margins matter. So he constantly refers to law as
doing nothing, being silent, or engaging in silent work, or the
silent background of law, amounting to only marginal change
around the edges, sometimes helpful and sometimes making
things worse (when you go to law), generally being around,
or occupying an unclear or ambiguous role. At the very least,
he seems to be calling for a kind of Hippocratic oath for law:
do no harm. In the process, he sort of elides the
methodological quicksand, flirting with functionalism
(except that his solution conveniently is that law does not
matter a good deal of the time), and winking at problems of
causation as they glide by (he offers no speculation about how
or why “the great silent background of law” was constituted).
In the parts of his book that discuss first, Buffalo, and then,
Jane Jacobs, law is barely mentioned at all, in effect
dropping out, hovering as an indifferent ghost observing the
chaos below.
II. B.
How Buffalo rose and fell is the subject of Part II of
Schlegel’s book where he spells out in granular detail what
composed the Buffalo economy and how it functioned.
Beginning his recounting of Buffalo’s long economic journey
with the decision to build the Erie Canal and have it
terminate at Buffalo Creek, Schlegel notes that
[h]ere the lake boats and the canal boats would exchange their
differing cargos at a harbor that, like much of the canal, was frozen
over anywhere from two to five months a year. Here Buffalo Creek
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would be deepened and widened until that sluggish stream was
transformed into the equally sluggish Buffalo River. The entrepôt
at the east end of Lake Erie would be Buffalo.52

The goal was to open up a western water route for the ports
of New York to facilitate the movement of commerce and
people rather than force that transshipment of goods and
relocation of persons to take place over traditional overland
routes.
Buffalo’s economy was partially forged by geographic
fortune. Its location was “a partner in economic destiny.”53
For “[g]eography meant that, wherever the Erie Canal would
terminate, the economy of the city that would grow up at that
terminus initially would be founded on trade and
transport.”54 And, as Schlegel reminds us,
[i]ndeed, Buffalo’s status as a trading place, an entrepôt, was soon
confirmed when in 1843 the most western of the rail lines that
would later comprise the New York Central Railroad followed the
canal builder’s identification of the flattest route from New York
City and so allowed trains from Albany to reach Buffalo.55

Buffalo then became “a major grain storage center, . . .
develop[ing] the first steam driven mechanical device for
unloading the [grain] boats [from the Midwest], as well as
the first grain elevator.”56 Both the canal and the railroad
spurred the arrival of immigrants, some on their way further
west, but some who stayed.57 “Foundries and other metal
shaping businesses grew in Buffalo starting in the 1840[s].”58

52. Id. at 102.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 103.
57. See id.
58. Id.
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And after the Civil War, “these four resources—water, rail,
grain and metalworking—formed the basis for Buffalo’s
economy.”59
The local geography was organized around water and
rail. One street grid was “radial, from a point near the
waterfront[;] . . . [t]he other [was] rectilinear, seemingly
centered on the same spot, but in fact centered on a street,
Main Street, two blocks to the east.”60 The problem with the
competing plans to organize the city was that they obviously
did not contemplate the proliferation of railroads serving and
traversing the streets of the city and attempting to get close
to the canal and lake. “The rail routes ran east to west at
street level all the way. They effectively cut the city in two,
separating north from south,”61 and eventually “the
agglomeration of rail lines was noticeably misaligned with
the original radial pattern of the streets.”62 Not surprisingly,
“[i]ndustrial employment followed neither the radial nor the
gridded street plan, but instead the water—the lake, both
rivers, and the canal system—as well as the railroads.”63
So what of the early life of “community” along with law
and economic change?
The spatial configuration of employment in the context of the
geography of the city meant that wherever one lived, getting to work
was not easy, at least unless one worked in the neighborhood so that
walking was possible. Thus the chaotic overlay of street plans,
railroads and employment opportunities fostered the growth of
strong, isolated neighborhoods. It was in these neighborhoods that
the ethnic structure of Buffalo was formed.64

Members of these communities “observed an ancient pattern,
living near to where they worked and shopping near to where

59. Id. at 104.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Id. at 107.
63. Id. at 108.
64. Id.
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they lived.”65 They were tied together by ethnicity, language,
religion, churches, employment, and separated by ethnicity,
language, religion, churches, employment, race, and
sometimes class.66 They were simultaneously bound together
and pulled apart.
Buffalo was growing, and its population “doubled in each
of the three decades following the Canal’s completion.”67 By
1860, it ranked 10th in population of cities in the United
States.68 And it had begun to move beyond its identity as
solely a site of transshipment and trade, and it had started
to diversify its economy, branching out into manufacturing,
particularly factories organized around metalwork.69
The intermediate aftermath of the Civil War
[was] not particularly good for Buffalo. The City’s population
continued growing, but at a substantially slower, forty-five percent
rate. The reason was fairly simple; the original entrepôt economy
was fading. By 1869, the combined freight leaving the City on the
Erie and New York Central railroads exceeded that by canal boat.
And by 1875 more grain was moving out of the City by rail than by
canal boat, a proportion that continued to increase. And by the
1880s the greatest portion of the coal coming to Buffalo was for use
there, not for transshipment.70

Railroad expansion rose dramatically in the nation and in
Buffalo, as did manufacturing.71 First, came basic iron
production and then manufacturing of coupling devices for
rail cars, storage batteries for railroad passenger cars, rail
car axles, etc.72 Buffalo became “a major manufacturing—
metal casting and bending—town. Most manufacturing

65. Id. at 109.
66. See id. at 108–12.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 112–13.
70. Id. at 115.
71. See id. at 116–19.
72. Id. at 118–19.

120

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

plants were small, serving niche markets.”73 And not to be
forgotten, there were nearly twenty active breweries.74
By the 1890s and into the Teens, Buffalo had become “a
big city.” “If ever Buffalo’s economy [was] in full bloom, these
were the years.”75 In 1890, Buffalo was the 11th largest city
in the country; by the 1900 census it was the 8th, larger than
Cincinnati, New Orleans, and San Francisco.76 “The Erie
Canal was of little economic importance anymore,” but the
railroads were still “to be found almost everywhere in the
community.”77 And Schlegel observes,
While the penetration of rail into the fabric of the City was
important for its economy, it remained an impediment to
community life because the greatest portion of the original lines into
Buffalo had been laid at street level. Given the degree that these
lines had divided the community into many small areas, passage
from one area to another was both dangerous and haphazard,
dependent as it was on whether train tracks blocked one’s way.78

Buffalo benefitted from advancing technology in the
design and construction of concrete grain elevators with
massive storage capacity; the building of the Lackawanna
Steel plant and smaller plants as well; the production of
motor vehicles (including Pierce Arrow and Ford), light
trucks, automobile radiators, and windshield wipers; the
early entrants into the aviation industry (without any roots
in metal bending); and the development of electric power
capacity.79

73. Id. at 120.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 134.
76. Id. at 122.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 123. The City asked the State of New York for help, and a Grade
Crossing Commission was established, which “labored and litigated for years,”
and “[e]ventually, it managed to secure agreement on the part of the relevant
lines to cooperate in the removal of most of the major crossings.” Id.
79. Id. at 124–32.
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Schlegel believes that “[i]n retrospect, however, there
were at least three troubling developments in these years.”80
First, was a reflection of the “meaning for Buffalo’s position
as the second [largest] rail hub in the United States.”81 The
city had once been an entrepôt, “first moving goods and
people from water to water,” and then “between water and
rail.”82 Now, “it increasingly became more dependent on rail
for the movement of resources in and goods out.”83 Second,
was “the disappearance of locally owned companies into
larger companies that were either owned elsewhere or
publicly owned and headquartered elsewhere.”84 And finally,
was “the establishment of Buffalo branches of firms located
elsewhere.”85
“Buffalo recovered quickly from the sharp, brief
recession that followed the end of World War I.”86 But there
were signs of decline. Though the major train terminal was
built in the 1920s, passenger traffic decreased.87 Why? The
automobile had arrived and with it the transformation of
transportation. Various steel plants were sold to out-of-town
corporations, including Lackawanna’s sale to Bethlehem.
Aircraft manufacturing suffered initially, as “Curtiss
Aeronautical, which was the largest aircraft manufacturer in
the world, saw its wartime contracts vanish in an instant,”
and after its reorganization, its founder, Glenn Curtiss,
“cash[ed] out his interest.”88
Some Buffalo firms failed during the Depression, but no
major banks in Buffalo closed. Federal money flowed to
80. Id. at 134.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 136.
88. Id. at 138.
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building projects, and the downtown development of the
1920s survived. The waterfront was showing signs of wear
and tear and decay, as traffic and factories shifted. But the
trajectory was unmistakable.
In 1910, the city had slipped from the 8th largest city in the United
States to the 10th, then 11th in 1920, 13th in 1930 and 14th in 1940
. . . . While the City’s population grew 13 percent between 1920 and
1930, suburban growth was 40 percent. Similarly, while the City’s
population grew less than one percent between 1930 and 1940,
suburban growth was almost 20 percent.89

The population movement threatened to recalibrate the core
of the regional economy.
Schlegel talks about the impact World War II had on
shaping the “post-war world economy” and on spurring “the
shift from an American economy focused on the Great Lakes
and the Northeastern corridor toward a more national
economy.”90 But for Buffalo, the war “turned out to have been
more of an interlude.”91 During the war years, “the area’s war
plants received contracts in a dollar amount that made it the
fifth largest defense-contracting site in the country,” though
it was the fourteenth largest city,92 and “[w]ar work
necessitated that the Federal Government build several new
plants,” including Bell Aviation and Curtiss-Wright.93 Many
of the city’s manufacturing firms began converting and
engaging in wartime production “seemingly disconnected
from [their] previous products.”94 “And then,” as Schlegel
puts it, “it all was over.”95
What was left in its wake? A relatively robust labor
movement with a unionized work force, collective bargaining
89. Id. at 142.
90. Id. at 144.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 145.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 146.
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agreements, some strikes and turmoil, and higher wages and
a growing demand for housing, slowly pushing residential
development further out from the city.96 And
“[c]oincidentally, but not wholly coincidentally, the
geographic structure of the region began to change.”97 The
change was to accommodate the automobile and other
vehicular traffic feeding housing, and it arrived in the shape
of the New York State Thruway and other road building
projects, in order to enhance economic investment and
growth. “[F]irst the Erie Canal had structured Buffalo[,] and
then the railroads had restructured Buffalo, eventually the
motor vehicle was going to restructure Buffalo.”98
But as to the traditional order that organized and shaped
Buffalo’s economic identity, “water, rail, steel, metal
bending, other manufacturing, banking [eventually], power
and Downtown,”99 some elements prospered, others
sputtered. Grain shipment and transshipment on the
waterfront were still thriving, railroad trackage continued
its decline, as did freight and passenger service in the face of
automobile and truck traffic.100 Steel did better, the shape of
auto manufacturing changed, and “[p]arts manufacturing for
export to assembly plants located elsewhere seemed to be
Buffalo’s niche.”101 The aircraft industry postwar had mixed
success, but there were pockets of “a certain optimism.”102
The airport was expanded in 1955, defense contracting
increased, some new firms stirred to life, and some old firms
“expanded the range of their products.”103 “[B]anks
prospered during these years, and affiliated lawyers with
96. Id. at 146–47.
97. Id. at 147.
98. Id. at 148.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 148–50.
101. Id. at 150–51.
102. Id. at 151–52.
103. Id. at 152–53.
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them . . . .”104 Downtown was holding its own, though
increasingly threatened by the building of suburban
shopping centers.105
The 1950s Buffalo economy, therefore, became a victim
of two changes. The normal explanation places blame on the
diversion of traffic and business from Buffalo as a result of
the combined effects of the opening of the St. Lawrence
Seaway and the interstate highway system beginning in the
late 1950s. Schlegel thinks that explanation is faulty. First,
postwar European grain markets were slow to recover, and
“[t]he completion of the lock and dam system on the Upper
Mississippi River permitted the development of a very
economical all-barge route down that river to a revived port
in Louisiana, a port that could easily serve South America as
well as the Pacific basin through the Panama Canal.”106 The
Buffalo transshipment route to the rail connections to
Atlantic ports just became more expensive than the water
route down the Mississippi, even before the Seaway opened,
and the railroads seemed uninterested in adjusting their rail
rates and costs to help out Buffalo.107 And, second, “the
decline in railroad trackage antedates World War I,”108 well
before the interstate highway system came to fruition. The
preconditions for decline had already been established.
The 1960s and 1970s continued the unraveling of
Buffalo’s economic verities. The transshipment trade and the
waterfront “became much quieter, though hardly silent,”109
particularly in grain. “The steel mills still needed deliveries
of iron ore and limestone, in fact, as the Vietnam War heated
up such picked up. But after American participation in that
war ceased[,] steel production began to decline and so [did]
104. Id. at 153.
105. Id. at 153–54.
106. Id. at 156.
107. Id. at 156–57.
108. Id. at 157.
109. Id. at 158.
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shipping to the mills.”110 Changes to railroads “were less a
result of a narrow combination of law and geographic
possibilities, than of the legacy of such. The Northeast simply
came to have too much railroad trackage for the economic
activity that needed railroad service.”111 Only two passenger
trains a day served Buffalo by the mid-1960s.112 Mergers
followed, then bankruptcies, then Amtrak, and the Middle
East oil price shock.113 “Buffalo’s days as a major rail hub
were over, as abandoned tracks and empty yards now
testified.”114 Steel also suffered after the Vietnam War from
cost competition from foreign steel makers utilizing new
technology.115 And “[t]he auto industry followed the same
path as steel with growth in the Sixties and trouble with both
quality and imports in the Seventies . . . .”116
Schlegel refers to the 1980s and 1990s as “bottoming
out.”117 Whatever industry there was, was failing.
Bethlehem, Republic, and Roblin Steel all closed, as did a
number of oil refineries and local manufacturers.118 “Autos
did better, but not well.”119 Some plants closed or moved or
were divested by the large auto manufacturers and left to go
it alone. A slight revival occurred in railroading under new
ownership, which brought back two railroads to Buffalo, just
as in the 1850s.120 And downtown stores continued to close.
Buffalo had become a region playing catch-up, and whatever
planning or public intervention that occurred was a species
110. Id.
111. Id. at 159.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 160.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id. at 164.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 165.
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of slow-motion emergency measures, accompanied by the
tentative movement to refocus the economy on higher
education, health care, and high-tech innovation.
What about the “community” promised in the title of the
book? Schlegel has news for us:
Buffalo never was a community. The combination of . . . [the] radial
street plan; the further fragmentation of the city that the railroads
brought; an ethnic immigrant population that wanted to live
together as a defense against those people it could not trust, on one
hand because they spoke a language that could barely be
understood and on the other because they were dumb, dirty and
worshipped in the wrong church, a variety of racism that would only
increase as later immigrant populations, especially Black, but also
Hispanic, found this to be a better place to live than the one before.
The only community that the City and eventually the area had
was the community of class.121

What are we left to gather from Buffalo’s experience of
economic decline? It depended very much on the
idiosyncrasies upon which the city was built. As Schlegel
observes,
For an entrepôt, a change in transportation patterns is key; for a
manufacturing economy, it is changes in technology, transportation
costs or what people want. In either case, it is an alteration in the
underlying competitive position that a particular locality possesses.
Moreover, for a city that combines these two economic models, the
two can interact if changes in transportation patterns reduce
locational positional advantage.122

Schlegel dates the beginning of Buffalo’s decline to about
one hundred years ago. To put it another way, the city
peaked somewhere in the neighborhood of 1900 to 1920,
when it “slid from the nation’s 8th, to its 11th, most populous
city.”123 But for Schlegel the more telling statistic is from
1916, “the year that America’s railroad system began its
decline by registering the first decrease in active trackage

121. Id. at 166–67.
122. Id. at 171–72.
123. Id. at 172.
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since 1830.”124 The “two World Wars masked the decline of
the railroads as did the Depression.”125 Freight shippers
slowly abandoned the railroads for trucks, tractor-trailers,
airplanes, and pipelines, while passenger travel increasingly
took place in automobiles and airplanes.
The various wars and their emphasis on war production
also hid the steel industry problems from view. In contrast,
“European and Asian steel makers who rebuilt after WWII,
rebuilt with the latest technology. As installed American
capacity wore out, the industry simply contracted.
Eventually mills were closed . . . .”126 At the end of the day,
Buffalo preferred an economy of entrenched localism, looking
inward and to the past as a guiding light.
II. C.
Schlegel next turned in Part III of the book to the work
of Jane Jacobs to find a theory that might explain how
Buffalo at first succeeded and then declined. He is insistent
in searching for an applicable theory on framing the right
questions. And they do not begin with the word “why.”
Schlegel writes,
After having listened for years to discussion about why an economy
has changed, I have become convinced that the why question is in
fact a proxy for a different set of questions. How can we stop change?
How can we make things change back? How can we restart growth,
preferably in the way I want it to occur? Or in desperation, how can
we restart growth, any growth?127

“How,” in Schlegel’s accounting, tells us more than “why.” He
wants to know how things work.
Schlegel finds Jacobs’s work organized around “three
assertions. The first is that cities are the basic units of

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 173.
127. Id. at 189.
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economic life and the source of economic growth, . . . by
nature economically vibrant and the only real problems with
city life are the economic or political actions that sap that
vitality . . . .”128 Second,
[c]ities grow as they do two things . . . . Initially, local entrepreneurs
learn how to produce goods that the city has regularly imported . . . .
These goods both replace the previous imports and can be used as
exports in trade with other, similarly situated cities. The funds
freed by the substitution of lower cost, locally produced goods for
higher cost imports and earned from the newly created exports can
then be used to purchase new, possibly more sophisticated,
imports.129

“[A]nd the cycle repeats itself again and again.”130 Third,
“[a]s part of the import substitution process, groups of
producers . . . begin to improve on production processes and
out of these improvements create both better versions of old
products, as well as new and different products.”131 Economic
growth results.
In Schlegel’s telling, Jacobs “identifies the ‘five great
economic forces of expansion,’”132 and it is hard not to think
of the economic history of Buffalo when examining them,
both for their presence and absence. For Schlegel, the list
provides a template for how successful cities work:
1. City growth provides expanded opportunities within the city for
new and different imports from its region. 2. The technology
developed in the city makes for increasing agricultural productivity.
3. While such increased productivity usually leads to diminished job
opportunities in agricultural areas, city growth opens jobs for those
so displaced. 4. As cities become congested, it becomes cost effective

128. Id. at 191.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 192.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 193 (quoting JANE JACOBS, CITIES
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 47 (1984)).
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to move city industrial facilities to nearby areas in the region.
5. Doing so increases the stock of capital in those areas, both from
the increase of land values and from the profits earned from the
goods and services provided by local residents to transplanted
facilities.133

If all these components occur more or less at the same time,
cities grow and “develop their own sub-regional import
replacing/export creating economies.”134 If those five factors
are not kept in balance, however, “cities will shape ‘stunted
and bizarre economies in distant regions,’”135 each in parallel
to the five features.
In Jacobs’s catechism of growth, it is also imperative for
cities pursuing strategies of economic expansion to avoid
what she calls “transactions of decline.”136 They come in
three forms: “prolonged and unremitting military
production; prolonged and unremitting subsidies to poor
regions; heavy promotion of trade between advanced and
backward economies.”137 All of these transactions violate her
basic model for urban economic growth.
Schlegel’s exposition of Buffalo’s economic history falls
within Jacobs’s theory of economic dependency and
transactions of decline. He finds that “[a]ll of the failed
strategies for economic development that Jacobs identifies as
such . . . are failed strategies advocated by planners and tried
in Buffalo’s own economic history.”138 First, as to “prolonged
and unremitting military production,” he finds limited
evidence in “the decline of Bell Aircraft, but also in the
problems at Bethlehem Steel and many other manufacturers
in finding new markets after wartime contracts were
133. Id. (discussing the “five great economic forces of expansion” listed in
JACOBS, supra note 132, at 47).
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting JACOBS, supra note 132, at 59).
136. Id. at 195 (quoting JACOBS, supra note 132, at 182).
137. JACOBS, supra note 132, at 183, cited in Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain,
supra note 17, at 226.
138. Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain, supra note 17, at 198.
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terminated.”139 As to the second, “subsidies to poor regions,”
he sees “the endless story of the . . . constant search for
federal, but also state and county, money for urban renewal;
roadway, subway, sewer and stadium construction; schools;
and waterfront revival, not to mention various tax breaks
offered to businesses enlarging, or newly establishing local
facilities.”140 And as for the third, “trade between advanced
and backward economies,” the decline “starts as early as the
great Lackawanna Steel works, its pride in, and the
recruitment of, branch plants producing goods the profits
from which flow elsewhere.”141
The transactions of decline violate Jacobs’s cardinal
rules because they foster dependency. In the case of military
production, “while exports are sometimes produced and paid
for from profits earned elsewhere, only rarely does this work
lead to innovations that might result in new work.”142 In the
instance of “subsidies to poor regions,” “no exports are even
created; tax funds raised from the profits earned elsewhere,
but also locally, are directed to benefit local life.”143 And
finally, as to “trade between advanced and backward
economies,” “exports are produced, sometimes in great
quantities, but the profits of those exports do not flow back
to the community in a way that would permit the community
to use those profits to purchase more and different imports.
Instead, they flow elsewhere.”144 In all these transactions,
the city of Buffalo slowly lost control of its fate.
But Jacobs’s theory also helps Schlegel explain how
Buffalo once worked:

139. Id. at 226.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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The area started as a natural resources economy—after all a
geographic locational advantage is not any less natural than a
mineral deposit which would be useless were it impossible to reach
the site or to move the ore to market. Then Buffalo seemed to build
a diversified import replacing/export creating economy, only to
slide, through no particular fault of its own, into being a
transplant/branch plant region. Buffalo stopped being a hotbed of
innovation and yet hid that fact by remaining an industrial
monolith that provided good, if dirty and at times dangerous, jobs
for large numbers, several generations, of immigrants and their
families.145

The lesson is pretty clear. Avoid relationships (public
and private) that create economic dependency and that send
out false signals and hopes of prosperity. Prosperity is locally
created and follows from diverse and mixed uses that
encourage and lead to innovation. For a long time, Buffalo
existed by the grace of geography and location, and it
eventually suffered by dint of geography and location as,
locked in place, it was literally bypassed when it could no
longer capitalize on what was once its natural advantage.
The economic world literally moved on as its pace,
technology, organization, activity, and productivity
accelerated. As Buffalo lost its capacity to participate
meaningfully in the newly minted economic changes, it also
lost its import replacement/export earning cycles.
Though Schlegel is occasionally critical of Jacobs’s
insights, it is basically in her work that he has found his
muse. And in her world, the smaller-scale, diversified
enterprises provided the economic engine for the city, rather
than the monoliths that first took advantage of geography
and location, until the smaller-scale enterprises were
swallowed up and with them the city’s vitality. The sense of
community, by which Schlegel seems to mean the middleclass core, was also hollowed out. In other words, Jacobs and
Schlegel in some ways prefer, for all its flaws, some version
of the lost, perhaps anachronistic, associationalist ideal, a
Main Street theory, focused on maintaining high wages

145. Id. at 239.
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through the high prices that would support the small, local
retail or wholesale businesses, which were the backbone of
the community. But these enterprises were increasingly
threatened as renewed competitive forces replaced
corporatist cooperation as the prevailing ethic of economic
activity.
III.
About eighty years ago, Karl Llewellyn observed,
“Jurisprudence as a Philosophy of Law is too narrowly
conceived” and “modern writers are conceiving it as a
philosophy not only of Law, but also of Law’s Function, and
of Law’s Operation, and of Legal Institutions: i.e., of Law and
Law’s Work.”146 Schlegel has answered Llewellyn’s call in his
attempts to explicate law’s function, and he has done so as
well in his related pursuit of the legal historian’s craft. For
as Schlegel has recently argued, “[t]he question of meaning
is the heart of historical practice.”147 He believes that
historical craft resides in determining how people lead their
lives and in telling stories and shaping narratives about
what he has discovered. Asking how (he’s not totally opposed
to asking why from time to time) gets you closer to the
meaning found in lived experiences, and asking how things
work gets you closer to the truth.148
After all these years, Schlegel is still watching.

146. Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 581, 606 (1940).
147. John Henry Schlegel, Philosophical Inquiry and Historical Practice, 101
VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2015).
148. On Schlegel and historical truth, see Matthew Steilen, Normativity and
Objectivity in Historical Writing, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 133 (2021).

